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EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL: TWO
FALLACIES AND A RESEARCH AGENDA
Joseph Fishkin * & David E. Pozen **
This Reply addresses the responses by Professors David Bernstein
and Jed Shugerman to our essay Asymmetric Constitutional
Hardball. Bernstein’s response, we argue, commits the common fallacy
of equating reciprocity with symmetry: assuming that because
constitutional hardball often “takes two” to play, both sides must be
playing it in a similar manner. Shugerman’s response, on the other
hand, helps combat the common fallacy of equating aggressiveness with
wrongfulness: assuming that because all acts of constitutional hardball
strain norms of governance, all are similarly damaging to democracy.
We suggest that whereas Bernstein’s approach would set back the
burgeoning effort to study constitutional hardball, Shugerman’s
distinction between hardball and “beanball” provides a useful starting
point for theorizing the conditions under which constitutional hardball
may be more or less justiﬁed as a matter of political and constitutional
morality.
INTRODUCTION
In our essay Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, we argue that from
the mid-1990s to the present, both Republican and Democratic officials
have engaged in signiﬁcant amounts of constitutional hardball, often in
response to each other, but that this practice has not been symmetric.
Republicans have engaged in more frequent and intense constitutional
hardball than Democrats. Our essay offers a multilevel explanation for
this asymmetry, which we think is crucial for understanding the past
quarter century of American politics.1
From the moment we began this project, we knew it would entail
serious methodological challenges. There are many kinds of constitutional
hardball and few straightforward ways to quantify most of them. Assessing
particular cases is not only inherently complex but also deeply entangled
with the sometimes-vehement claims of partisans and participants themselves about how different episodes ought to be characterized—claims
* Marrs McLean Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law.
** Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
Colum. L. Rev. 915 (2018).
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that are endemic to the practice of constitutional hardball. Nevertheless,
we concluded that the evidence of asymmetric constitutional hardball is
sufficiently robust, and the stakes of understanding its causes and effects
sufficiently high, that we ought to move ahead with our analysis.
We are thankful to Professors David Bernstein and Jed Shugerman
for thoughtful and detailed responses to our essay. They come at the
subject from opposite directions. Bernstein contests our claim that there
is a current asymmetry in the practice of constitutional hardball. He
argues that when one considers certain examples of Democratic constitutional hardball that we did not discuss, and in addition when one reallocates
more of the responsibility for various government shutdowns to Democrats,
the appearance of partisan imbalance disappears.2 Shugerman argues the
reverse. According to Shugerman, our essay substantially understates the
degree of asymmetry, both by omitting certain examples of Republican
constitutional hardball and by failing to emphasize the distinctiveness
and severity of some of the examples we do discuss.3
The responses differ, as well, in their methodological approaches.
Bernstein is intensely skeptical of the proposition that it is ever possible
to determine whether one side is playing more aggressive constitutional
hardball, at least in situations where both sides are playing to some extent.4
He is particularly skeptical that it is ever possible to apportion greater
responsibility for a government shutdown to one side over another, given
that shutdowns necessarily involve the failure of two sides to reach an
agreement.5
Shugerman, on the other hand, agrees with our basic asymmetry
thesis but insists that some instances of constitutional hardball are so
much more egregious than others as to require an additional conceptual
category.6 He calls this category “beanball.” Roughly, beanball consists of
political actors breaching norms of constitutional politics in an especially
antidemocratic fashion, attempting, as it were, to knock their opponents
2. David E. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball Yes, Asymmetric Not So Much, 118
Colum. L. Rev. Online 207 (2018) [hereinafter Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball], http://
columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Bernstein-CONSTITUTIONAL_
HARDBALL_YES_ASYMMETRIC_NOT_SO_MUCH.pdf [http://perma.cc/SSA8-XZXM].
3. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Hardball vs. Beanball: Identifying Fundamentally
Antidemocratic Tactics, 119 Colum. L. Rev. Online 85 (2019), http://columbialawreview.org/
content/hardball-vs-beanball-identifying-fundamentally-antidemocratic-tactics/ [http://perma.
cc/PU76-PVMF]. The basic disagreement between Bernstein and Shugerman bears out a
prediction made in the conclusion of Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball : “We expect that
some right-leaning readers may remain skeptical of the asymmetry thesis, while some leftleaning readers may feel we have enacted something analogous to the very Democratic
tendencies we discuss, by being overly anxious to identify caveats and complications.”
Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 976.
4. See Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 208–11.
5. See id. at 210–11.
6. See Shugerman, supra note 3, at 87–89.
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out of the game.7 Whereas Bernstein would seemingly lump all hardball
acts and actors together—not only denying the existence of any meaningful
partisan discrepancy but also abandoning the entire endeavor of investigating patterns of distribution or questions of responsibility—Shugerman
would split the ﬁeld further—not only distinguishing constitutional
hardball from ordinary politics but also distinguishing ordinary hardball
from extraordinary beanball.
The contrast between these two responses is illuminating. We believe
that much of Bernstein’s analysis is based on a fundamentally ﬂawed
premise: that whenever it can be shown that constitutional hardball is
reciprocal, in the sense that both sides are playing, it follows that such
hardball is also symmetrical, in the sense that both sides are playing in a
similar manner. We can understand the appeal of this premise. It seems
to offer an escape from the difficulty of evaluating which political
maneuvers place more or less strain on existing norms of governance
and which political actors bear more or less responsibility for such strain.
Unfortunately, however, that escape route is a mirage. The student of
constitutional hardball cannot avoid making these kinds of contestable
judgments—and indeed, they are at the heart of Bernstein’s own account
of recent political history. Even if evaluating practices of hardball may be
an irreducibly interpretive enterprise, 8 certain interpretations of the
record are bound to be better supported, both by the contextual evidence
and by the relevant legal and political science literatures. Sober analysis
in the service of identifying these interpretations is essential to making
sense of our constitutional life.
Shugerman’s key methodological move holds considerably more
promise for the burgeoning effort, which our essay seeks to advance, to
deepen understanding of constitutional hardball. 9 The concept of
beanball needs further clariﬁcation and development, in our view. But it
supplies a thought-provoking starting point for refining normative

7. See id. at 88.
8. Cf. Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65
UCLA L. Rev. 1430, 1439 (2018) (noting that “all judgments about norm following and
norm violating are subject to . . . interpretive contestation,” “usually in the absence of an
authoritative adjudicator”).
9. In addition to our own essay and Professor Mark Tushnet’s foundational piece,
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523 (2004), see, for example,
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die 106–27 (2018); Greg Sargent, An
Uncivil War: Taking Back Our Democracy in an Age of Trumpian Disinformation and
Thunderdome Politics 145–52 (2018); John M. Carey et al., Searching for Bright Lines in the
Trump Presidency, 17 Persp. on Pol., no. 3, 2019, at 1, http://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IYWXMF
[http://perma.cc/EA5J-4WNM]; and Matthew A. Seligman, Constitutional Politics, Court
Packing, and Judicial Appointments Reform (Cardozo Law Sch., Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 548, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3210665 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).

2019]

EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL

161

assessments of the government shutdowns, showdowns, and myriad other
forms of hardball that the nation is likely to face in the near future.
I. RECIPROCAL YES, SYMMETRICAL NOT SO MUCH
Bernstein challenges Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball’s descriptive
thesis in two main ways: by enumerating some examples of alleged
Democratic constitutional hardball, especially by the Obama Administration,
that are missing from our analysis10 and by contesting our claim that
congressional Republicans bear greater responsibility than Democrats for
government shutdowns and threatened shutdowns during the Clinton
and Obama Administrations.11 Shugerman’s response exposes a number
of serious problems with Bernstein’s examples as well as a host of important
“omissions” in his historical narrative. 12 We agree with Shugerman’s
critiques and will not tax readers’ patience by repeating them here. (We
have additional disagreements with Bernstein that we discuss brieﬂy in
section I.B.) Let us focus, instead, on the question that Bernstein poses
to frame his response: “Who [is] to [b]lame for a ‘[s]hutdown’”13?
A.

Responsibility for Government Shutdowns

As we write this sentence, on January 23, 2019, the U.S. government
is in the midst of the longest partial shutdown on record.14 Hundreds of
thousands of government employees have been furloughed or forced to
work for extended periods without pay. Untold numbers of other
Americans have had their lives and livelihoods unsettled. In terms of
sheer length and magnitude of disruption, this shutdown appears to be
at least a modest escalation of the shutdown hardball that has occurred in
recent decades. But who is doing the escalating? Is there any way to tell?
Bernstein’s central critique of our essay is that assessing responsibility for acts of constitutional hardball is a hopelessly subjective exercise.
Comparative analyses such as ours, he asserts, are doomed to “dubious
empirical validity.”15 To support this assertion, Bernstein focuses on our
discussion of government shutdowns, which he notes are “one of the . . .
primary examples” we give of an area in which constitutional hardball
has been asymmetric.16 We suggest in our essay that House Speaker Newt
Gingrich and his Republican allies in Congress played harder hardball

10. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 209, 212–17.
11. Id. at 210–12.
12. Shugerman, supra note 3, at 86.
13. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 210.
14. See generally The Longest Shutdown, NBC News, http://www.nbcnews.com/
holidayshutdown [http://perma.cc/8P8V-QH8N] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
15. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 208.
16. Id. at 209.
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than President Bill Clinton when the government shut down in 1995.17
Bernstein questions our appraisal of this episode and submits that, in
important respects, Clinton was the aggressor.18 Similarly, with regard to
the most recent shutdown, one might ask whether it is fair to lay more of
the blame at the feet of President Donald Trump rather than House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and her Democratic allies in Congress. Every
government shutdown involves some sort of bargaining breakdown in
which at least two political factions make choices that fail to result in an
agreement. There is thus a kind of formal symmetry between the
bargainers, in that each has failed to accede to the other’s demands. As
the Associated Press put it in a much-discussed (and quasi-retracted19)
tweet: “[I]t takes two to tango. Trump’s demand for $5.7 billion for his
border wall is one reason for the budget impasse. The Democrats[’]
refusal to approve the money is another.”20 The Associated Press’s tweet
mirrors Bernstein’s approach.21
Is this really the best that a fair-minded political observer can do? We
doubt it. Any number of pieces of evidence might be marshalled in support
of a more substantive allocative assessment. With regard to the most
recent shutdown, for instance, the ﬁrst clue is the President’s own words.
“I am proud to shut down the government for border security,” Trump
said in a high-proﬁle televised meeting with Democratic congressional
leaders.22 “If we don’t get what we want . . . I will shut down the government,
absolutely. . . . And I’ll tell you what, I am proud to shut down the
government for border security . . . . So I will take the mantle. I will be
the [one] to shut it down.”23 While not conclusive evidence, these statements

17. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 930, 963.
18. See Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 210 (“From a purely
constitutional perspective, if Congress passes a spending bill that would keep the government
open and the President vetoes it, then the President—not Congress—has shut down the
government.”).
19. See Erik Wemple, Update: AP Walks Back Tweet That Blamed Both Sides for
Government Shutdown, Wash. Post (Jan. 9, 2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2019/01/09/associated-press-stands-by-tweet-blaming-both-sides-government-shutdown
[http://perma.cc/L3KC-WLDY].
20. AP Politics (@AP_Politics), Twitter (Jan. 8, 2019), http://twitter.com/AP_Politics/
status/1082857277084893184 [http://perma.cc/6ZTA-EQ9R].
21. Compare id., with Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 210 (“[I]f
the President and Congress are unable to reach a compromise that would lead the
President to sign a spending bill passed by Congress, both the President and Congress
played constitutional hardball to shut down the government.”).
22. Aaron Blake, Trump’s Extraordinary Oval Office Squabble with Chuck Schumer
and Nancy Pelosi, Annotated, Wash. Post (Dec. 11, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2018/12/11/trumps-extraordinary-oval-office-squabble-with-chuck-schumer-nancypelosi-annotated [http://perma.cc/QSP9-78QF].
23. Id. Bernstein acknowledges that in the 1995 episode “some congressional
Republicans, including Speaker Gingrich, made public statements essentially welcoming a
shutdown.” Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 212.
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strongly support the proposition that the President intended to cause a
shutdown, that he was “proud” to play this form of constitutional hardball
in order to “get what we want.”
President Trump’s claim of responsibility is also supported by undisputed facts. A government shutdown might arise because each side seeks
reforms to the budget or the budgetmaking process that the other side
refuses to accept. This was not that sort of shutdown. In this case, one
side (here, the Democrats) repeatedly passed “clean” continuing resolutions to reopen the government, with no demands for changes to the
baseline of budgets hammered out in prior rounds of negotiation, while
the other side (here, the President supported by Senate Republicans)
pressed for a signiﬁcant change to that baseline (speciﬁcally, $5.7 billion
in funding for “the wall”) and insisted that it would not allow the government to be reopened until this singular demand was met.24 Only one side
was using the shutdown as a means to push through a high-priority
political objective. For reasons we discuss in Asymmetric Constitutional
Hardball, it is not altogether surprising that a party ideologically committed
to attacking the federal government on a variety of fronts might ﬁnd
federal government shutdowns an appealing form of policy leverage.25
Seeing this requires the sort of context-sensitive, political-sociological
analysis that Bernstein wishes to discredit.
Historical events are susceptible to multiple interpretations, both
immediately and over time. But some interpretations may nevertheless be
superior to others. 26 Bernstein’s retrospective reimagining of the
Clinton–Gingrich confrontation inadvertently illustrates this point quite
24. See, e.g., Juliegrace Brufke, House Votes on 10th Bill to Reopen Government,
Hill (Jan. 23, 2019), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/426666-house-passes-eighth-billto-reopen-government [http://perma.cc/K52M-7HJD] (discussing “the 10th clean-funding
measure that Democrats have voted on to end the partial government shutdown, with
most of them passing in the chamber”); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, Senate Set to
Reject Government Funding Plan It Once Embraced, Politico (Jan. 23, 2019), http://www.
politico.com/story/2019/01/23/senate-government-funding-votes-fail-1121640 [http://
perma.cc/F2YY-GCLW] (recounting some of this history and reporting that, according to an
anonymous Republican Senator, “GOP leaders are trying to crush the [latest] ‘continuing
resolution’ to force Democrats to negotiate on Trump’s border wall”). The “clean” continuing
resolutions play a useful role here as an objective indicator of which side was insisting on
changes to the status quo. By themselves, these resolutions are not dispositive evidence of
their opponents’ playing harder hardball. But they are strong evidence, particularly in the
absence of some exigency so recent that it could not have been dealt with in the last budget
agreement and so significant that it calls into question the relevance of the previously
agreed-upon budget baseline.
25. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 961–65.
26. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 523, 551 (1995) (noting that while historians do not necessarily “determine
what is historically true,” “they commonly resolve what is historically convincing”); Thomas
L. Haskell, Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick’s That Noble
Dream, 29 Hist. & Theory 129, 134 (1990) (defending a “conception of objectivity,” implicitly
shared by most historians, that is “compatible with strong political commitment”).

164

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 119:158

well. Because Shugerman refutes Bernstein’s account of this confrontation at some length,27 we will not belabor it here. But the view that
Clinton broke more rules of normal constitutional politics than Gingrich
during the 1995 shutdown is simply a poor interpretation of what
happened. The preexisting patterns of legislative–executive budgetary
negotiations, the parties’ rhetoric about their actions, the parties’ goals
and intentions (to the extent they can be discerned), and the contemporaneous responses of knowledgeable observers can each inform a
judgment about the extent to which either side is playing constitutional
hardball.28 In the shutdowns of the mid-1990s, these factors all point
toward Gingrich as the disrupter of the constitutional status quo and the
harder hardball player.29
Accordingly, Bernstein’s suggestion that Clinton was equally or even
more responsible than Gingrich for shutting down the government does
not demonstrate what Bernstein implies it demonstrates: that assessing
the partisan distribution of constitutional hardball is a fool’s errand. On
the contrary, Bernstein’s own chief example demonstrates that such
assessments can be made with reasonable empirical validity and without
compromising norms of scholarly objectivity. There is a broad consensus
that Gingrich was the principal constitutional norm-breaker in this instance,
a consensus buttressed by multiple overlapping forms of evidence.
And so, rather than ﬂip one of our main examples on its head,
Bernstein’s discussion of government shutdowns devolves into a recapitulation of points we ourselves emphasize in Asymmetric Constitutional
Hardball: that “constitutional hardball is by nature reciprocal” and that
“both Democratic and Republican officeholders engage in it to some
substantial extent.”30 No one disputes this. It is a fallacy, however, to conflate
this observation about hardball reciprocity with a conclusion of hardball
symmetry.31 As we stress in our essay, “even if constitutional hardball is by
27. Shugerman, supra note 3, at 94–96.
28. Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball canvasses dozens of historical examples, without
dwelling at length on any, and it examines possible drivers of hardball asymmetry at a
wholesale rather than a retail level. But for any given constitutional confrontation, these
same sorts of factors can be analyzed to help get purchase on which side, if any, is playing
hardball and to what degree.
29. In addition to Shugerman’s valuable discussion of this episode, see Fishkin &
Pozen, supra note 1, at 961–65, 963 n.189 (quoting Gingrich and other Republican leaders
as expressing excitement about closing the government and explaining why contemporary
Republicans are more predisposed than Democrats to support shutdowns); and Peter M.
Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly Shutdowns,”
Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups,” 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 503, 516–
21 (2003) (describing ways in which Gingrich’s behavior during the 1995 shutdown
“dramatically . . . departed from conventional inter-branch practice” as well as public
sentiment).
30. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 927.
31. When President Trump declared after the lethal violence at the August 2017
Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, that “there is blame on both sides,” Full Text:
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nature reciprocal, it nonetheless remains possible that one side may play
hardball more frequently or intensively than the other side over a
sustained period of time.”32 Nothing in Bernstein’s response addresses
this possibility, much less refutes it.
B.

Additional Errors and an Instructive Example

Bernstein’s other efforts to refute the asymmetry thesis miss the
mark in more obvious respects. Bernstein contends, for instance, that our
“focus on the twenty-ﬁve-year period beginning in 1993 . . . does not
excuse ignoring the Reagan and Bush shutdowns.”33 On its face, this
contention seems odd: To focus on a certain historical period is, by
definition, to pay less attention to other periods. The gravamen of
Bernstein’s charge must therefore be that our real claim (assumed or
implied) is that constitutional hardball has been asymmetric for much
longer than twenty-ﬁve years, but that we have cherry-picked the post1993 period in order to elide inconvenient counterexamples.
This reﬂects a fundamental misreading of our essay. Asymmetric
Constitutional Hardball explicitly notes that “[a] historical study with a
longer time horizon might reveal that asymmetric constitutional hardball
has an epicyclical character in the American system, with the party that
feels it was on the losing end of prior periods of hardball becoming the
dominant hardball player in subsequent periods.”34 The asymmetry that
the essay describes and diagnoses is a story about the past quarter century

Trump’s Comments on White Supremacists, ‘Alt-Left’ in Charlottesville, Politico (Aug. 15,
2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/15/full-text-trump-comments-whitesupremacists-alt-left-transcript-241662 [http://perma.cc/K4YQ-A33C], he was widely ridiculed
for committing a related fallacy. It is true that it takes two “sides” (or more) to have any conflict.
But it is a logical error to infer from this that the sides bear equal moral responsibility for the
conflict, just as it is a logical error to assume that they must be fighting in a similar manner.
32. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 927. We go on to detail many reasons,
grounded in the legal and political science literatures, to suspect that this possibility has
been realized in recent U.S. experience. Id. at 938–76. Bernstein does not attempt to
dispute any of these reasons, which constitute the core of our argument.
33. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 212.
34. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 933–34; see also id. at 942 n.110 (“As we have
suggested, built-in counterdynamics may tend to complicate or reverse the directionality
of asymmetric constitutional hardball over long political cycles.”).

166

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 119:158

or so, since the Gingrich Revolution.35 We chose this period deliberately
and defended the choice. Earlier periods may be different.36
Bernstein’s response also focuses almost exclusively on Obama-era
executive actions rather than on congressional machinations, notwithstanding our essay’s argument that the clearest asymmetries can be found
in legislative contexts. 37 He provides only one example of legislative
hardball that our essay failed to consider. In support of the claim that
“congressional Democrats . . . did sometimes play constitutional hardball
during the Obama years,” 38 he calls attention to Senate Democrats’
(largely symbolic) vote in 2014 in favor of a constitutional amendment to
overturn Citizens United v. FEC.39
This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of constitutional
hardball. Absent very unusual circumstances, proposing a formal amendment to the Constitution does not “break the perceived rules of normal
constitutional politics,” as all acts of hardball deﬁnitionally do.40 It is the
epitome of playing by the rules.
The bulk of Bernstein’s examples take the form of recharacterizing
Obama Administration initiatives in ways that make them seem more
norm-shattering, more ruthless, or otherwise more nefarious than our
essay suggested. Bernstein is the legal academy’s most unrelenting critic of
the Obama Administration. If one believes, as he does, that this
Administration was uniquely craven and “lawless”41—a view that is
35. “The way he saw it,” recalls a recent chronicle of Gingrich’s rise to power,
“Republicans would never be able to take back the House as long as they kept compromising
with the Democrats out of some high-minded civic desire to keep congressional business
humming along.” McKay Coppins, The Man Who Broke Politics, Atlantic (Nov. 2018), http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/newt-gingrich-says-youre-welcome/570832
[http://perma.cc/DP4D-UTK5] (last updated Oct. 17, 2018). Gingrich’s “strategy was to blow
up the bipartisan coalitions that were essential to legislating, and then seize on the resulting
dysfunction to wage a populist crusade against the institution of Congress itself.” Id.
36. Although we acknowledge Shugerman’s careful dissection of what occurred during
the shutdowns of the Reagan and Bush years, we do not take the position (and here we may
differ with Shugerman) that the present pattern of asymmetric constitutional hardball
necessarily predates Gingrich’s speakership. The constitutional-governance dynamics of
those years were distinct, in no small part because of a less polarized Congress.
37. See, e.g., Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 920 (“[T]he most straightforward cases
of hardball often occur in legislatures. Legislative bodies teem with rules and norms, not
expressly required by constitution or statute, that govern the interactions among political
blocs within the institution.”); id. at 937 n.95 (“[W]e observe greater asymmetry [in
Congress].”).
38. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 217.
39. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
40. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 925. More formally, we define constitutional
hardball as political maneuvers that “violate[] or strain[] constitutional conventions for
partisan ends” or “attempt[] to shift settled understandings of the Constitution in an unusually
aggressive or self-entrenching manner.” Id. at 921–23 (emphasis omitted).
41. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lawless: The Obama Administration’s
Unprecedented Assault on the Constitution and the Rule of Law (2015).
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commonplace in right-wing media but that has little correspondence
with reality as most everyone outside that epistemic community sees it—
then reading many of President Obama’s behaviors as outrageous instances
of constitutional hardball may make some sense. Absent that belief,
Bernstein’s catalog of “unilateralist tactics”42 looks far less compelling.
Like all of his recent predecessors, President Obama engaged in some
forms of executive action that pressed various envelopes. Unlike his predecessors, Obama generally did so in response to “unyielding opposition” by
congresspersons from the other party to his policies and to the legitimacy
of his presidency.43 Bernstein’s portrait of rampant lawlessness under
President Obama’s watch is not simply uncharitable; it carries overtones
of the “paranoid” political worldview identiﬁed by Richard Hofstadter44
and foregrounded by Shugerman.45
Consider for a moment the central charge in Bernstein’s bill of
particulars. His depiction of the Obama Administration’s efforts to reach
a nuclear nonproliferation deal with Iran as “a particularly important
example of Democratic constitutional hardball”46 not only rests on a
hyperbolic account of the deal’s development (and one that entirely
ignores the extreme tactics of its opponents) but also glosses over the
critical detail that the Administration framed the deal as a legally
nonbinding “political commitment.” 47 As Professor Marty Lederman
explained at the time, “Presidents and their diplomatic agents have been
entering into such nonbinding political agreements on behalf of the U.S.
for over a century,” in all cases without congressional approval, to the
point that such agreements are now “ubiquitous.”48 As Professor Jack
Goldsmith has highlighted, the nonbinding formulation also made the
deal relatively easy to undo, “pav[ing] the way for President Trump to
withdraw from it” unilaterally.49 Constitutional hardball by the Obama

42. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 219.
43. Robert Draper, Do Not Ask What Good We Do: Inside the U.S. House of
Representatives, at xix (2012); see also Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 932–33 (elaborating
on this point); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L.J. 2, 6–8
(2014) (same).
44. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 973–75 (discussing Richard Hofstadter, The
Paranoid Style in American Politics, Harper’s Mag., Nov. 1964, at 77).
45. Shugerman, supra note 3, at 89, 121–22.
46. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 222.
47. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International
Law, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1201, 1220 (2018).
48. Marty Lederman, Congress Hasn’t Ceded Any Constitutional Authority with Respect
to the Iran JCPOA, Balkinization (Aug. 8, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/08/
congress-hasnt-ceded-any-constitutional.html [http://perma.cc/V7JE-26HN].
49. Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Administration Reaps What the Obama Administration
Sowed in the Iran Deal, Lawfare (May 9, 2018), http://www.lawfareblog.com/trumpadministration-reaps-what-obama-administration-sowed-iran-deal [http://perma.cc/M2Y9S279].
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Administration? Debatably. Hardball so “vigorous” 50 as to upend the
whole asymmetry thesis? Hardly.
At almost the exact same time that Bernstein’s response was published
(on December 7, 2018), before the most recent federal government shutdown, American politics supplied an instructive example of asymmetric
constitutional hardball at the state level. Following a template used in 2016
by their North Carolina counterparts, outgoing Republican legislators in
Michigan and Wisconsin passed bills to strip authority from their states’
newly elected Democratic governors.51 Meanwhile, Democrats in New
Jersey proposed a reform to their state’s legislative redistricting process
that many observers, though not all,52 characterized as a ploy to “writ[e]
gerrymandering into the State Constitution.”53 Yet the New Jersey Democrats
quickly backed down after being blasted by leading Democratic Party
ﬁgures, 54 liberal media outlets, 55 and liberal advocacy groups 56 for an
attempted “partisan power grab[].”57 Leaders in the Republican national
network did not likewise revolt, or say much of anything, against the
Michigan, North Carolina, or Wisconsin measures.58
50. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 232.
51. See Russell Berman, ‘Wisconsin Has Never Seen Anything Like This,’ Atlantic
(Dec. 5, 2018), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/wisconsin-gop-seeksto-limit-democrat-everss-powers/577411 [http://perma.cc/F4ZW-LDMK]; Max Boot, America
Now Has a Party of Authoritarianism—It’s the GOP, Wash. Post (Dec. 11, 2018), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/11/america-now-has-party-authoritarianismits-gop [http://perma.cc/YJ46-WQV3]. Our essay focuses on the federal government, but
it gives reasons to “expect that most of our claims about asymmetric constitutional hardball
are likely to hold at the subfederal level as well.” Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 930 n.55.
52. See, e.g., Michael McDonald (@ElectProject), Twitter (Dec. 14, 2018), http://
twitter.com/electproject/status/1073822375093907456 [http://perma.cc/D3NX-NZKY]
(arguing that the New Jersey Democrats’ proposed reform was based on “a cornerstone of
just about every partisan fairness metric”).
53. Nick Corasaniti, After Backlash, Democrats in New Jersey Rethink Redistricting Plans,
N.Y. Times (Dec. 16, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/nyregion/redistrictingnj-democrats-republicans.html [http://perma.cc/NZL7-3ADE].
54. See id. (discussing opposition to the proposal by Democratic Party leaders
including former Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. as well as “progressive activists and
academics”).
55. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, New Jersey Democrats’ Diabolical Gerrymandering
Scheme Is an Affront to Democracy, Slate (Dec. 13, 2018), http://slate.com/news-and-politics/
2018/12/new-jersey-gerrymandering-plan-bad.html [http://perma.cc/K8QG-TJZW].
56. See, e.g., Tim Lau, New Jersey’s Flawed Redistricting Measure, Brennan Ctr. for
Justice (Dec. 14, 2018), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/new-jerseys-flawed-redistrictingmeasure [http://perma.cc/WA7J-RSFK].
57. Stern, supra note 55.
58. See Jon Green (@_Jon_Green), Twitter (Dec. 14, 2018), http://twitter.com/_Jon_
Green/status/1073613360707579904 [http://perma.cc/62NY-CUCQ] (calling attention
to this discrepancy and its relevance for “asymmetric hardball”). It should be noted that
unlike his Wisconsin counterpart Scott Walker, the outgoing Republican Governor of
Michigan, Rick Snyder, vetoed some of the most contentious lame-duck legislation in late
December. See Mitch Smith, Fears of Republican Power Grab in Michigan Fade as Governor
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Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball emphasizes that hardball practices
are shaped by a broad set of actors within each party’s coalition.59 As
these state-level developments reﬂect, over the past several decades there
have been more signiﬁcant actors within the Democratic coalition who
are apt to discourage rather than encourage various forms of constitutional hardball. Virtually any group of politicians in a two-party system
will be tempted to play constitutional hardball at least semiregularly, and
sometimes will go ahead and do it. Again, no one disputes this. But
again, it does not follow that every group therefore approaches constitutional hardball with the same incentives and constraints or employs it
with the same success.
II. “BEANBALL” AND THE NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF HARDBALL
If the fallacy of conﬂating reciprocity with symmetry threatens to get
in the way of clear-eyed empirical assessments of constitutional hardball,
a different fallacy threatens to get in the way of clear-eyed normative
assessments. Simply put, it is a mistake to assume that constitutional
hardball is inevitably or irredeemably bad.60 As we argue in Asymmetric
Constitutional Hardball, “[w]hile all acts of constitutional hardball create
systemic risks, . . . speciﬁc acts may be justiﬁed for a variety of contextual
normative reasons; sound political judgment might even require that
certain types of hardball be played in certain situations.”61
Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball does not develop this analysis
much further.62 Clearly there is a great deal of work to be done, on both
sides of the equation. On one side: Which kinds of contextual reasons
may make constitutional hardball more defensible on democratic, legal,
or other grounds? On the opposite side, equally important: Which kinds
of constitutional hardball are more damaging than others, such that the
reasons needed to justify them must be stronger—perhaps, in some cases,
so strong that these forms of hardball will almost never be justiﬁed?

Vetoes Bill, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/us/michigansnyder-power-veto.html [http://perma.cc/NBJ9-J5JT].
59. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 943–59.
60. On the importance of not fetishizing constitutional and political norms simply in
virtue of their being norms, see Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 8, at 1445–47; Jedediah
Purdy, Normcore, Dissent (Summer 2018), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/normcoretrump-resistance-books-crisis-of-democracy [http://perma.cc/5UHQ-SUK5]; and Corey
Robin, Democracy Is Norm Erosion, Jacobin (Jan. 29, 2018), http://www.jacobinmag.com/
2018/01/democracy-trump-authoritarianism-levitsky-zillblatt-norms [http://perma.cc/SND9X7S9].
61. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 925.
62. See id. at 925 n.39 (“Theorizing the conditions under which constitutional hardball
is justiﬁed as a matter of political or constitutional morality is an important task, but one
that would require another, very different sort of paper.”).
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Shugerman’s distinction between hardball and beanball seeks to
advance analysis of the second question. He argues that certain forms of
norm-breaching behaviors, the ones he calls beanball, are different in
kind from the rest in that they are “fundamentally antidemocratic”63:
They aim to undermine political opponents’ ability to participate in the
democratic process. Voter suppression is Shugerman’s paradigm case of
beanball, but he maintains that a variety of other tactics, from extreme
gerrymandering to racialized appeals to white constituents to the politicization of the Department of Justice, should also qualify.64
We are skeptical that the hardball/beanball distinction can be
demarcated with a bright line. While Shugerman seems to suggest that
hardball and beanball are distinct phenomena,65 it seems to us that beanball
is better understood as a subset of hardball. Shugerman’s framework also
raises complex and interesting issues about what qualifies as “fundamentally
antidemocratic”—a test that implicates large questions of democratic
theory and would be central to drawing any workable boundary around
the category of examples that Shugerman groups as beanball.
That said, we think Shugerman’s core point is powerful and correct.
In constitutional politics, there are many different norms that members
of either party might breach, and many different means for those in
power to entrench their preferred view of the Constitution. But not all of
these potential hardball maneuvers impose the same costs on the constitutional system. Consider two examples near the extreme ends of the
spectrum. Suppose, ﬁrst, that a majority party unilaterally abandons or
dilutes the “blue-slip” custom through which home-state Senators have
historically been allowed to block certain judges. Senate Republicans did
just this in the most recent Congress,66 and it clearly counts as constitutional hardball—one more foray in the long-running judicial confirmation
wars. Like all constitutional hardball, such a move might be viewed as
unfair, and it has the potential to undermine institutional values ranging
from trust to civility to comity to cooperation. The democratic value of
the blue-slip custom itself, however, was always rather dubious;67 in the
63. Shugerman, supra note 3, at 87.
64. Id. at 88, 110–21.
65. See, e.g., id. at 87 (describing beanball as “[w]hat goes beyond hardball”).
66. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 950–51 & n.137; Fred Barnes, Mitch
McConnell Goes to the Mattresses for Trump’s Judicial Nominees, Wkly. Standard (Oct. 11,
2017), http://www.weeklystandard.com/fred-barnes/mitch-mcconnell-goes-to-the-mattressesfor-trumps-judicial-nominees [http://perma.cc/U2AG-KTF6].
67. See, e.g., The Selection and Conﬁrmation of Federal Judges (Part 1): Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 62 (1979) (statement of David Cohen,
President, Common Cause) (“The present blue slip system serves narrow political aims
and should be abandoned. A selection process so rooted in personal politics is an act of
political self-indulgence and inevitably undermines public respect for the judicial
system . . . .”); Brannon P. Denning, The Judicial Conﬁrmation Process and the Blue Slip,
85 Judicature 218, 225 (2002) (“Despite the difficulty one has pronouncing the process
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abstract, many partisans on both sides of the aisle might agree that the
judicial conﬁrmation process is better off without it.
Now consider an effort to purge the voter rolls. Suppose that
election officials from one political party employ an imprecise scheme of
name-and-birthday matching in order to achieve the predictable consequence of un-registering many voters who were lawfully registered, in a
manner that will redound on net to the beneﬁt of the election officials’
party. Suppose as well that because of the makeup of the relevant courts,
this initiative can proceed without a high risk of meaningful judicial
pushback. In broad strokes, state Republican officials have been accused
of spearheading such efforts in recent years.68 This second example is
also a form of constitutional hardball. But it differs along a number of
salient axes from the ﬁrst example, the most obvious of which is that to
the extent that it works, it does so by (differentially) disenfranchising
some of the other party’s voters.
Shugerman wants us to stop calling the second example hardball
and start calling it beanball. On his account, this sort of example is not
simply norm-breaking; it is democracy-breaking. We agree. Anyone trying
to defend such behaviors faces a very high, and perhaps insurmountable,
burden of justiﬁcation. Whether or not we need an entirely separate
label for this category, we have compelling reasons to repudiate constitutional hardball that operates by disenfranchising political opponents.
(Conversely, constitutional hardball that operates by improving the
system of democratic representation, such as by enfranchising people
who ought to be enfranchised but have not been, may be especially
defensible.69) Even if certain other forms of hardball are equally effective
at entrenching incumbents, the democratic harm of outright disenfranchisement is arguably unique.

unconstitutional, the blue slip is clearly at odds with the advertised beneﬁts of dividing
responsibility for nomination and conﬁrmation between the president and the Senate.”).
68. See Christopher Ingraham, This Anti-Voter-Fraud Program Gets It Wrong over 99
Percent of the Time. The GOP Wants to Take It Nationwide., Wash. Post: Wonkblog (July
20, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/20/this-anti-voter-fraudprogram-gets-it-wrong-over-99-of-the-time-the-gop-wants-to-take-it-nationwide [http://perma.
cc/X4J7-XZRQ].
69. For a preliminary exploration of when constitutional hardball may be most
defensible, see David Pozen, Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball, Lawfare (Oct. 11, 2018), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/hardball-andas-anti-hardball [http://perma.cc/T4NC-N6HS]. As that
essay notes, future “Democratic majorities [in Congress] seeking to pass a transformative
election law statute may run up against a welter of blocking ploys, from ﬁlibusters to secret
holds to denials of committee quorums, unless and until they themselves resort to
constitutional hardball.” Id.
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CONCLUSION
The project of Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball is, as the essay states,
“primarily descriptive and explanatory”70: not to condemn constitutional
hardball but to try to understand it better. Identifying any given behavior
as constitutional hardball is only the beginning of analysis. The careful
study of the phenomenon depends on an appreciation of this point.
Shugerman suggests that “fundamentally antidemocratic” modes of
constitutional hardball should be judged especially harshly.71 Fundamentally prodemocratic modes, in contrast, merit an opposite response. But
what counts as fundamentally antidemocratic or prodemocratic, and
what should we make of all the cases that lie in between? To date, there
has not been much work on the question of when and why certain types
of constitutional hardball may be justified as a matter of political morality.
Nor has there been much work on the important question Shugerman
raises of when and why certain types of constitutional hardball must be
seen as beyond the pale. Developing criteria to guide both sets of
judgments is a vital task for scholars and reformers alike.

70. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 976.
71. Shugerman, supra note 3, at 87.

